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ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel Kokotajlo: The Lesser Evil: A Defense of Self-Sampling and Centered Conditionalization 
(Under the direction of John Roberts) 
 
 
 
 In this paper, I develop a taxonomy of views about how beliefs should be updated in 
situations of indexical uncertainty. Drawing on previous literature, I show how each view is subject 
to its own apparent reductio ad absurdum. I argue that two of the three views are more absurd than was 
previously believed. I argue that the third view—which is held by Bostrom, Elga, Sebens & Carroll, 
Arntzenius & Dorr, and myself—actually has a pretty good defense against the objection it faces. 
This matters because the various views have important empirical implications.  
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Introduction: 
 
 The Doomsday argument says that we should significantly increase our credence that 
humanity will go extinct in the next few hundred years.1 The Fine-Tuning argument says that we 
should significantly increase our credence in Theism and/or in some sort of multiverse 
cosmology.2Anthropic Shadow arguments say that the probability of civilization-destroying events is 
higher than commonly believed—that tail risks of this sort are systematically more likely than trends 
in the data indicate.3 Arguments from entropy say that most of our current cosmological theories are 
false.4  
 Formal epistemology constructs and compares formal models for how to reason, typically 
versions of Bayesianism.5 Each of the arguments mentioned above has the interesting property of 
being sound on some of the models which have been thus far proposed, and unsound on others. 
Thus, the controversy over which version of Bayesianism (if any) is correct has important and wide-
ranging implications. 
                                                 
1
Because our observations (of our birth-rank) are more probable if there are fewer people in the world. (Leslie 1992) 
 
2
Because it would be incredibly unlikely for the constants of nature to be life-supporting by chance. (Tegmark 2014) 
 
3
Because extinction events and near-extinction events are underrepresented in our data. (Bostrom et al, 2010) 
 
4
Because they predict that we are probably freak observers, and hence are self-undermining. (Carroll 2017) 
 
5
For our purposes this means that they speak of credences, rather than beliefs, and paradigmatically say that you 
should proportion your credences according to some sort of conditionalization rule. 
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 This paper classifies three popular Bayesian views about how to reason, explains how each 
kind of view faces its own purported reductio ad absurdum, and argues that a particular view—the Self-
Sampling Assumption—can avoid the objection it faces. This paper is a response to a paper by 
Christopher Meacham, who invented some of these reductios, and who instead favors a model called 
Compartmentalized Conditionalization. (Meacham 1) 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, which can be skipped by 
readers familiar with this literature, I define key terms and explain important concepts that will be 
used throughout. In Section 2, I lay out the three kinds of views—dubbed “Up-And-Down,” 
“Down-Only,” and “Hold-Steady”—and summarize the problems with them. This provides a 
roadmap and reference for the rest of the paper. In Section 3, I discuss the “Up-And-Down” view 
and the argument against it. In Section 4, I discuss the “Down-Only” view and the argument against 
it. In Section 5, I discuss the “Hold-Steady” view, the argument against it, Meacham’s defense 
against that argument, and why the defense doesn’t work. In Section 6, I return to the “Up-And-
Down” view and examine the argument against it in more detail. I argue that there are two versions 
that need to be considered, one involving potential infinities and one involving actual infinities. In 
Section 7, I defend the “Up-And-Down” view against the potential infinities version of the 
argument. In Section 8, I defend it against the actual infinities version. Finally, in Section 9, I 
conclude with some general thoughts and takeaways. 
 
I. Key Concepts 
 
 This section explains what worlds and centered worlds are, and the other basics of the 
Bayesian framework. It also explains how synchronic centered conditionalization works, which will 
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be useful for understanding several of the views we will consider later. Readers familiar with these 
concepts are welcome to skip this section. 
 In this paper, “possible worlds,” “centered worlds,” and “worlds” are all hypotheses in the 
minds of the agents we are modelling.6 A centered world is a maximally specific hypothesis; it takes a 
stance on everything, including on indexical questions like “what time is it?” and “who am I?” A 
possible world is maximally specific except that it doesn’t take a stance on those sorts of questions. It 
only takes a stance on non-indexical matters; all its pronouncements are in the third person. Thus a 
possible world is a set of centered worlds—a set of centered worlds which differ only in their 
answers to questions like “who am I?” and “what time is it?” Different possible worlds contain 
different numbers of centered worlds; for example, a possible world in which the only people who 
ever exist are Adam, Eve, and God, and they only live for ten seconds each, contains thirty centered 
worlds.7 Sometimes it is helpful to think of a possible world as a physical object rather than a 
hypothesis—just picture it as a universe, rather than as a description of one—and likewise it’s 
helpful to think of a centered world as a particular person at a particular time in a particular universe. 
 In this paper I’ll use “world” as shorthand to mean either possible world or centered world, 
depending on the context. In cases where it might be unclear, I’ll use the full term. I’ll use “center” 
as shorthand for “centered world.” 
Classical bayesian conditionalization decrees that your credences in any given proposition A 
should be P(A|E) where P(.) is the credence function you had a moment ago, and E is whatever 
                                                 
6
That is, they are epistemically rather than metaphysically or logically possible. 
 
7Assuming the relevant unit of time is the second. It’s unclear what unit of time, if any, should be used in our 
models; fortunately, none of the claims in this paper depend on which unit we choose. There’s an additional caveat: 
As I’ve set things up, it’s conceptually possible for there to be more centered worlds than these in this world; for 
example, imagine a hypothesis which says “You are no one” instead of saying you are Adam, Eve, or God. 
Arguably such a hypothesis is coherent, though the versions of Bayesianism I am familiar with don’t include such 
hypotheses. 
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new evidence you’ve gained since then. Synchronic Centered Conditionalization is basically the same 
thing, but with two tweaks: 
Synchronic Centered Conditionalization (SCC): For any given agent, at any given time, 
the rational credence to have in any proposition A is P(A|E), where E is the total evidence 
available to the agent at that time, and P(.) is the agent’s hypothetical prior credence function. 
Propositions are sets of centered worlds.8 
 
 The first tweak is the “Centered” part. All that means is that we are explicitly dealing with 
credences in indexical claims as well as non-indexical claims; the hypothesis space is constituted by 
centered worlds. The second, more substantial tweak is the “Synchronic” part. Rather than making 
P(.) be whatever your credences were a moment ago and E be whatever new evidence you’ve gained 
since then, we say that E is all of your evidence, and P(.) is your hypothetical prior credence function — 
basically, a construct that means something like how inherently plausible you find the various 
hypotheses, before taking into account any of your evidence.  
 Synchronic Centered Conditionalization is appealing in its simplicity; it also has very nice 
properties such as expected-accuracy-maximization. (Das 2017) (Classic Bayesianism has some of 
these properties too, but leads to problems in e.g. Shangri-La cases.)9 However, SCC is compatible 
with a wide range of actual behaviors, because it places no constraints on the hypothetical prior. 
Later in the paper we will consider versions of SCC that are built by adding in such constraints. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8I don’t know who first came up with the idea. SCC sometimes goes by the name of (centered) Ur-Prior 
Conditionalization, sometimes (centered) Hypothetical Prior Conditionalization, and sometimes the Principle of 
Total Evidence. (Meacham 2008) 
 
9
See Arntzenius (2003) 
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II. The Options Available 
 
 This section maps out and explain the three categories of views that I’ll be considering in 
this paper. I will also, for completeness’ sake, discuss what it would take to have a view outside these 
categories. 
 Consider the following diagram, depicting two possible worlds that someone is dividing 
credence between: (It helps to think of it as a depiction of the Sleeping Beauty problem)10 
 
 First the person is in the red evidential state, then the orange, and then the yellow. How 
should their credence in World Two relative to World One change over time? You might think it 
should go up and then down, or that it should stay the same and then go down, or that it should 
                                                 
10
This diagram is an abstraction from the famous Sleeping Beauty case: World One is the heads world and Two the 
tails world; red is Sunday evening, orange is the evidential state of just having woken up during the experiment, and 
yellow is the evidential state of just having been informed that it is Monday. (I suppose there would also be a green 
circle in World Two, representing the state of just having been informed that it is Tuesday. I’m focusing on the red, 
orange, and yellow states though.) 
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hold steady throughout. The three types of views I consider in this paper are generalizations of these 
three options; each view is characterized by a thesis of the same name. This chart provides a helpful 
summary of the views and the problems with them, which I will describe later: 
 
 
The Type of View Who Holds It? Reductio Argument Against It 
Up-And-Down Thesis: 
Increases in the relative number of 
centers in a world compatible with 
your evidence make you increase 
your relative credence in that world, 
and decreases make you decrease it.  
Myself, Bostrom11 (Self-
Sampling Assumption), 
Elga, Sebens & Carroll 
(ESP-QM),12 
Arntzenius & Dorr13 
Many-Brains Argument: Your 
credence that the world contains 
many duplicates of you, and that 
you are not the original, will be 
constantly increasing. 
Down-Only Thesis:  
Decreases in the relative number of 
centers in a world compatible with 
your evidence make you decrease 
your relative credence in that world, 
but increases don’t change your 
credence at all. 
Lewis, arguably many 
people who follow 
classical Bayesianism 
Sadistic Scientists Argument: In the 
long run your credence that 
duplicates of you are being 
created and destroyed will 
approach 0, even if you are seeing 
it happen with your own eyes. 
Hold-Steady Thesis: 
Neither increases nor decreases in 
the relative number of centers 
compatible with your evidence make 
a difference. 
Meacham 
(Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization), Neal 
(Full Non-Indexical 
Conditioning) 
Varied Brains Argument: Your 
credence that the world contains 
at least one center in each 
possible evidential state can never 
go down and will increase rapidly. 
 
Important Note: The increases and decreases discussed in this chart are understood to be increases 
and decreases that don’t involve zero. Everyone agrees that when the number of centers in your 
evidential state in a world is zero, you should rule out that world as incompatible with your evidence. 
                                                 
11Technically, Bostrom’s view is “It Depends” (described below) because he uses centers-in-your-reference-class 
rather than centers, and because he leaves it wide open what your reference class is. However, there’s certainly a 
natural version of Bostrom’s view that fits in this category: The one in which your reference class is all centers.  
 
12
(Bostrom 2002) 
 
13
(Arntzenius & Dorr 2016) 
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What they disagree about is what to do when both of the worlds you are considering have at least 
one center which is in your evidential state, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Other views, which will not be considered in this paper, are: 
Up-Only: Increases in the relative number of centers in a world compatible with your 
evidence cause you to increase your credence in that world, but decreases don’t change your 
credence at all. 
 
Nobody that I know of holds this view. More importantly, it is vulnerable to both the Varied Brains 
Argument and the Many Brains Argument.14 
It Depends: Sometimes increases in the relative number of centers in a world compatible 
with your evidence cause you to increase your credence in that world, but sometimes they 
don’t. It depends. 
 
This view is promising, but there are too many ways it could go: too many things “it” could depend 
on. So I won’t consider it here, other than to make the following important remark: Each of the 
three arguments mentioned above—Many Brains, Sadistic Scientists, and Varied Brains—involves a 
peculiar skeptical hypothesis or situation designed to exploit the view. They can be tailored to fit the 
specifics of the view they are dealing with. As a result, it’s not obvious that saying “It Depends” will 
help avoid the arguments, because the skeptical scenario can be modified to include whatever “it 
depends” on.15 
Backwards: Like one of the above views, except that increases in the relative number of 
centers in a world compatible with your evidence cause decreases in your credence in that 
world, etcetera. 
 
I see no reason to hold this view; I mention it for completeness’ sake. 
Something Completely Different: Perhaps all of these views are based on a mistake 
somehow. Perhaps we shouldn’t have credences at all, for example, but rather beliefs. 
                                                 
14
And the defense of the Both-Kinds view that I’ll give does not work to defend the Up-Only view. 
 
15For example, Bostrom’s view makes it depend on whether the centers are in your reference class—so all we need 
to do is specify in the skeptical hypotheses that they are. There may be views that posit dependencies that allow 
them to truly wriggle free from these arguments. I can’t really go into more detail here without explaining the 
arguments first, so I’ll return to the subject at the end of the paper. 
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This view is beyond the scope of this paper. I mention it for completeness’ sake. 
 In the next three sections, I will walk through the three rows of the chart, explaining the 
types of views in more detail and laying out the arguments against them. 
 
III. Up-And-Down Views & the Many-Brains Argument 
 
 Meacham, who came up with the Many-Brains-Argument, targeted it at a much narrower 
range of views than this. (He introduced this argument as part of a larger attack on synchronic 
centered conditionalization16) However, it’s easier to explain the argument at this level of generality: 
 
                                                 
16Meacham’s view—Compartmentalized Conditionalization—is, I suspect, equivalent to a particular version of 
synchronic centered conditionalization, namely the one you get when you add the following constraint on priors: 
The ratio of the total prior W1 assigns to evidential state E to the total prior W2 assigns to E, is the same for any E 
which is in both W1 and W2, where W1 and W2 are arbitrary worlds. 
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The argument goes like this. Pick your favorite non-skeptical hypothesis, whatever it is. Presumably 
it will look something like World W: A chain of centered worlds, representing yourself as you age.17 
Construct a skeptical hypothesis, World D, by taking your favorite hypothesis and then modifying it 
to include many identical copies of you being created far away, at a rate of one per unit of time, and 
maintained in such a way that they continue to be in exactly the same evidential state as you. 
 Since you subscribe to an Up-And-Down view, your credence in World D increases every 
time step, since the number of centers in D compatible with your evidence (relative to the number 
of centers in S compatible with your evidence) goes up. So even if you begin with almost zero 
credence in World D and almost complete confidence in S, given enough time, you will become 
arbitrarily confident in D relative to S. 
 Of course, in the actual world our hypothesis spaces are not so restricted; they contain more 
than just these two worlds. But it’s plausible to think that this result generalizes: When we include all 
the hypotheses that we actually have credences in, we’ll end up more and more confident over time 
in these strange skeptical duplication hypotheses. This seems bad. 
 I will hold off commenting on this argument for now, because sections 7, 8 and 9 will handle 
it with great detail. Section 6 will also explain why I interpret Bostrom’s view as a Up-And-Down 
view and why, thus interpreted, it has initial plausibility. See Meacham for an account of why Elga’s 
view fits the Up-And-Down category. (Meacham 14)  
 
IV. Down-Only Views & the Sadistic Scientists Argument 
 
 This type of view holds that decreases in the relative number of centers in a world 
compatible with your evidence make you decrease your relative credence in that world, but increases 
                                                 
17
There will be other chains corresponding to other people as they age, but I leave these out for simplicity. 
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don’t change your credence at all. Meacham has a good argument that Lewis holds this view. 
(Meacham 17) I also suspect that at least some forms of diachronic Bayesianism fit in this category. 
Here’s why: 
 
 Technically, P(Orange|Red) is zero, so it’s hard to say what classical diachronic Bayesianism 
says you should believe when you are in the orange evidential state.18 Yet when you were in the red 
state, you had complete confidence that you would end up in the orange state: Both World One and 
World Two predict that. So intuitively, when you find yourself in the orange state, you shouldn’t 
change your relative credence in World One or World Two from whatever it was before. Now, your 
credence in “I’m the center on the far right in the World Two diagram” should be nonzero when 
you are in the orange evidential state.19 As a result, when you are in the orange evidential state you 
should think that the likelihood of seeing the yellow evidential state in a moment is higher if World 
                                                 
18The probability that “I am now in the orange evidential state” given “I am now in the red evidential state” is zero. 
 
19
After all, it is by definition compatible with your evidence. Surely it is unreasonable to assign zero credence to a 
hypothesis you are considering which is compatible with your evidence. 
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One is the case than if World Two is the case.20 So when you are in the yellow evidential state, you 
should increase your credence in World One relative to World Two. 
 Thank you for indulging me in that digression. If it hasn’t already paid for itself by helping to 
motivate the Down-Only view, I hope it will do so in this next part, by making it easier to explain 
the Sadistic Scientists Argument:21 
 Suppose you subscribe to the Down-Only view, and you have an enemy who wants to drive 
you insane and has the technology and resources to create duplicates of you. This enemy can ruin 
you by creating a duplicate of you, and then deleting it, and then creating another one, and then 
deleting it, and so on. (To visualize this, just imagine Figure 3 except with the pattern repeating for 
many more time steps into the future.) The finishing touch is for your enemy to give you lots of 
convincing evidence that this is what they are doing—perhaps they send you videos, signed letters 
from credible third-party witnesses, perhaps they even give you a tour of their brain-duplication 
machinery. (They should do this before, or soon after, they start the duplication process.) 
 Why would this ruin you? Well, notice how in the original case (described in Figure 3) you 
end up with a lower credence in World 2 than you started with. In this case, World 2 is the actual 
world; it’s also the world that you have tons of evidence for. But given enough time, you’ll come to 
disbelieve in World 2, no matter how high your initial credence in it was, because each round of 
duplication-and-then-deletion causes you to decrease your credence in World 2. So eventually you’ll 
believe in alternative hypotheses in which this duplication is not taking place, despite all evidence to 
                                                 
20
On some views of personal identity, this move can be blocked by saying that the two World Two orange centers 
are really one bi-located person, or else that for psychological continuity reasons the World Two yellow center is the 
successor state of both centers. This issue can be avoided by adding a green center to the diagram in World Two, 
psychologically continuous with the right-hand orange center. 
 
21Meacham’s original argument put it slightly  differently: He merely said that we would become unreasonably 
confident that duplicates of us are not being created and destroyed, even if we were seeing it happen with our own 
eyes. For many people this is already an unacceptable consequence of the view. 
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the contrary. Perhaps you’ll believe that you are hallucinating, or that the supposedly reputable third 
parties are part of a vast conspiracy against you, etcetera. 
 This seems bad. Sure, we don’t have the technology to do this now, but what if we did? 
Anyone who subscribes to a view of this type would be vulnerable to an embarrassing sort of attack. 
Worse, there’s reason to think that views of this type will eventually lose faith in most of our current 
best theories in cosmology, since most of them posit faraway duplicates being created and destroyed. 
(See Section 5 for further details.)  
 
V. Hold-Steady Views & the Varied Brains Argument 
 
 In this section, I’ll explain Meacham’s view, and why it fits in this category. I will then give 
the Varied Brains Argument and explain why Meacham thinks it isn’t so damaging. I’ll finish by 
arguing that the argument is much more damaging than Meacham realizes. 
 Meacham’s view is called Compartmentalized Conditionalization. (Meacham 5) It is a version of 
synchronic conditionalization; that is, it uses hypothetical priors and total evidence to tell each 
centered world what to believe without referencing the beliefs of earlier centered worlds. Each 
centered world, according to compartmentalized conditionalization, should choose its credences as 
follows: Rule out all the possible worlds inconsistent with your evidence, and renormalize the 
credences. Then, for each world that remains, rule out the centered worlds within it which are 
inconsistent with your evidence, and renormalize within that world. An example helps: 
Suppose our hypothetical prior distributes probability according to the area of this diagram. 
Each rectangle is a center in a world; each color is an evidential state. 
13 
 
 
Suppose our current evidential state is Green. Then in the first step, we eliminate World C because it 
is incompatible with our evidence, and renormalize: 
 
Next, within each world we eliminate the centers incompatible with our evidence, and renormalize 
within each world: 
14 
 
 
 
 Now that we understand how compartmentalized conditionalization works, we come to the 
Varied Brains Argument, paraphrased from Meacham: (Meacham 20) 
 
Consider two sets of hypotheses. First, there is the set of normal hypotheses, which cover all the 
hypotheses about the world that you consider remotely plausible: W1-4. Then, there is the set of 
skeptical hypotheses, which are constructed from the first set by adding a mad scientist somewhere 
15 
 
far away, who makes a bunch of duplicates of you with a diverse array of experiences, at least one for each 
series of centers in the first set.22 
 Anyone who follows compartmentalized conditionalization will, as time goes on, assign 
more and more credence to the second set of hypotheses relative to the first.23 The rate of this 
growth will be quite dramatic; on plausible assumptions the credence in the second hypotheses 
grows by orders of magnitude every time step.24 This is an unwelcome consequence. 
Meacham takes this argument seriously, but he thinks it is not very damaging for his view. 
Here’s what he has to say in defense of Compartmentalized Conditionalization: 
In the varied brains case, your credence in your strange worlds increases relative to your 
credence in your normal worlds because of the artificial way in which these doxastic worlds 
have been selected: all the strange worlds under consideration are ones that will end up 
matching whatever you experience, whereas many of your normal worlds won't match what 
you experience. If we restricted the normal worlds to those compatible with [what you in 
fact will experience], your credence in your strange worlds would not increase relative to 
your credence in your normal worlds. Likewise, if we placed no restrictions on which strange 
worlds were allowed, then [said experiences] would eliminate lots of strange worlds as well as 
lots of normal worlds. Whether your credence in strange worlds increases relative to your 
credence in normal worlds depends on which strange and normal worlds are your doxastic 
worlds which worlds our priors and evidence lead us to believe could be ours…. 
 
Skeptical results can be roughly divided into two kinds. First, there are results which entail 
that people like us in situations like ours should be lead to skepticism. Second, there are 
results which entail skeptical consequences for people in outlandish situations, but which 
have little bearing on people like us. I take it that the first kind of result is worse than the 
second. … The varied brains argument is a result of the second kind… The many brains 
                                                 
22
Philosophers like to create thought experiments which begin like this: "Suppose a mad scientist builds a…” A 
common objection is that these scenarios are so unrealistic that we can't learn anything from them. I think that we 
philosophers should respond to this by changing all our examples to instead start with "Suppose a mad philosopher 
builds a… etc." This makes the thought experiment more realistic, because only a philosopher would ever want to 
do the things we allege mad scientists would do. (Why would a philosopher do those things? Because by actualizing 
these obscure possibilities, they would conclusively refute the common objection!) 
 
23
This is because none of the possible worlds in the second set will be ruled out, but some possible worlds in the first 
set will be ruled out, at every time step. So Step One of compartmentalized conditionalization will always be taking 
credence from the first set and distributing it to both sets. Step Two won’t change this distribution, because it only 
redistributes credence within a possible world. 
 
24
Each time step you rule out all the normal worlds incompatible with your evidence; so, for example, if there are 
ten evidential states that you could experience in the next time step and they all have equal prior, then 90% of the 
normal worlds will be ruled out. 
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argument, on the other hand, is a result of the first kind; it entails that people like us should 
come to believe that we live in a strange world.25 (Meacham 21) 
 
As I interpret him, Meacham’s defense goes like this: Sure, in this toy model (where the hypothesis 
space contains only worlds in these two categories) we get the skeptical result. But we have no 
reason to think that this will generalize to our actual situation. After all, we consider many more 
hypotheses than these. When we include all the hypotheses we consider, there will be additional 
skeptical hypotheses, and perhaps many of them will be ruled out by our data, and so perhaps the 
total credence in skepticism will not rise over time—perhaps the two effects will cancel out.  
A helpful analogy: On any Bayesian view, every time you observe something, call it A, you’ll 
increase your credence in the skeptical hypothesis that an A-loving demon exists who is hell-bent on 
getting you to observe A. And if that’s the only skeptical hypothesis you are considering, then your 
overall credence in skeptical hypotheses will rise too. But if you consider a wider range of skeptical 
hypotheses—as you should—then you needn’t be worried, because the rise in credence in the 
aforementioned hypothesis will get will be cancelled out by the drop in credence in other 
hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that a B-loving demon exists who is hell-bent on getting you to 
observe B. Your overall credence in skepticism will hold steady. 
As I interpret him, Meacham is hoping that something like this will apply in the case of the 
Varied Brains argument also. 
 In what remains of this section, I will argue that (an improved version of) the Varied Brains 
Argument is devastating for Compartmentalized Conditionalization and for Hold-Steady views more 
                                                 
25
Meacham goes on to argue that the Sadistic Scientists Argument is also a skeptical problem of the second sort and 
thus also relatively benign. 
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generally.26 There are several independent considerations, each troubling on its own, which together 
are quite damning. 
 I’ll start with the fact that what Meacham calls “Strange worlds” are not actually that strange; 
the “people in outlandish situations” that Meacham pities are in fact us. This is because  many of our 
current best cosmological theories are what Bostrom calls Big Worlds: They posit a very large 
universe, large enough that for any evidential state that you or I might experience, there is bound to 
be someone out there who is in that state. (Bostrom 51) 
For example, if the universe lasts forever in a state of heat-death, random quantum 
fluctuations will, with very high probability, eventually produce observers in exactly our evidential 
state who are nevertheless massively deceived, their world being about to dissolve into chaos again. 
(Even ordinary non-quantum fluctuations have a high likelihood of doing this. Also, black holes are 
said to have some probability of spitting out any arbitrary object, so enough black holes lasting long 
enough would do the trick.) Another example: If some version of the Many-Worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics is true, then for every situation that you might end up in, there is some branch of 
the multiverse where you (or a duplicate of you, depending on how personal identity works) do end 
up in that situation. Another example: On some theories, the universe is spatially infinite; as 
Bostrom says, this would be the simplest topology. (Bostrom 51) Another example: If some sort of 
eternal inflation cosmological model is correct, then the universe is spatially and temporally infinite, 
and moreover contains infinitely large regions with every possible set of constants. If any of these 
theories are true, the world is Big: that is, the world is such that for every possible evidential state 
you or I might end up in, there is someone somewhere sometime who is in that state. (For a 
discussion of all of these ideas, see Tegmark, and also Bostrom) 
                                                 
26The improved version of the argument isn’t original to me. Bostrom thought of it in 2002, though of course he 
didn’t apply it to Meacham’s view in particular. (Bostrom 2002) What I’m doing is elaborating on Bostrom’s 
argument a bit and applying it to these particular views. 
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Now, you don’t need to be convinced that we are likely in a Big World. As long as you 
assign, say, at least 0.000000001 credence to the proposition that the world is Big, you’ll end up 
almost certain that it is, within a few seconds—if you follow Compartmentalized Conditionalization. 
This is because your evidence rules out large swathes of the non-Big worlds, but never rules out any 
of the Big Worlds. For example, in writing this paper I used a random-number generator to produce 
the following number between 1 and 100,000,000: 42,464,580.27 Presumably your priors assign 
roughly equal credence to each of the possible numbers I could have displayed above.28 So when you 
saw that number—42,464,580—you ruled out roughly 99.9999999% of the small-world hypotheses 
(weighted by their prior) and none of the Big-world hypotheses.29 Obviously this sort of thing will 
make your credence in Big World approach 1 extremely rapidly, even if it starts out very small.  
It gets worse. There’s another problem for compartmentalized conditionalization: Your 
relative credences in various Big Worlds can never differ from the priors! This means that many 
ordinary parts of science become impossible. The following example illustrates this point:  
Cosmologists tell us that the cosmic microwave background radiation level (CMB) is about 
2.7 degrees Kelvin. They discovered this by measuring it. Prior to measuring it, they were unsure 
about what it would be. But many of them thought we were likely in a Big World. So for them, the 
epistemic situation prior to measuring the CMB was like this: 
                                                 
27I used a “True random” number generator: https://www.random.org/ 
 
28
Assuming you follow the Principal Principle or something like it. 
 
29I’m ignoring for simplicity the medium-world hypotheses, in which the universe contains very large numbers of 
duplicates in a very wide variety of evidential states very similar to yours, but not all of the evidential states are 
represented. Compartmentalized Conditionalization would rule out many, but not 99.9999999%, of these worlds. 
Including these hypotheses would make the picture more complicated but would not fundamentally change the 
dynamics. 
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In this diagram, as usual, colors represent evidential states. Importantly, in this diagram orange 
represents the evidential state the scientists were in just prior to making the measurement of the 
cosmic microwave background radiation level, red represents the evidential state of just having 
observed a 2.7 K on the screen, and yellow represents the evidential state of just having observed a 
3.1 K on the screen. Other possibilities besides these two worlds are left out for simplicity. 
 In the diagram, the twelve centers on the left-hand side of each world represent the vast 
numbers (proportions, if the worlds are infinite) of observers who genuinely are living on planets, 
who genuinely are observing the cosmic microwave background levels, etc. The four centers on the 
right represent the occasional freak observer, formed randomly out of heat-death or popped out of a 
black hole or something, whose randomly generated experiences and/or local environment happens 
to exactly match that of the normal observers, for now at least. 
 Consider how the scientists would handle this situation if they followed Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization. Suppose that at t=1 they have roughly equal credence in each of these two 
worlds, and that they are overall fairly confident that at least one of these worlds is actual. Then at 
t=2, they find themselves in the red evidential state. If they update using Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization, they end up with the same relative credences in these worlds. After all, none of 
these worlds were ruled out by the evidence! Even worse: They’d end up massively increasing their 
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credence in the proposition “I am a freak observer,” because their credence in the world where 
CMB = 3.1 is now entirely concentrated in the centered world in which they are freak observers. 
 In general, there are two problems for Compartmentalized Conditionalization. The first is 
what Meacham’s Varied Brains argument was getting at, but more precise: Big Worlds are never 
ruled out by one’s evidence, so a Compartmentalized Conditionalizer’s credence that the actual 
world is Big can never decrease and in fact will increase rapidly.30  If we take cosmologists at all 
seriously, the decrease in credence that non-Big skeptical hypotheses get will not be nearly enough 
to cancel out the increase that Big Worlds get. 
 The second problem is that a Compartmentalized Conditionalizer can never change their 
relative credences in the various Big Worlds. When they observe CMB = 2.7, for example, rather 
than decreasing their credence in Big World 2 and increasing their credence in Big World 1, they 
keep their credence in each world the same, and shift all of the credence within Big World 2 to the 
freak observers it contains—thus becoming much more confident that they are a freak observer! (A 
version of this problem arises in non-cosmological cases as well, if you don’t like this talk about Big 
Worlds.)31 
 The two problems interact to make a pretty grim reductio of Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization: Anyone who holds it will become more and more confident that the world is Big 
each time they observe something that rules out a non-Big world, and moreover if we want to take 
contemporary cosmology seriously we should assign not-astronomically-tiny credence to the world 
                                                 
30
More precisely: Since Big Worlds never get ruled out, credence in them will increase whenever non-Big worlds 
are ruled out. This will happen almost all the time--for example, worlds in which you have no duplicates get ruled 
out in droves every time step, since for every thing you might experience, there’s a non-Big world which says you 
will experience that.  
 
31
Matt Kotzen articulated the example well: Suppose we duplicate you so that there are ten people in your evidential 
state. We flip a coin and on heads we say “heads” to nine people and “tails” to one, and on tails we say “tails” to 
nine people and “heads” to one. Compartmentalized Conditionalizers will continue to have 50/50 credence in 
heads/tails even after they are told, despite the fact that prior to being told they would have said “Conditional on 
heads, I’m probably going to be told heads, and conditional on tails, I’m probably going to be told tails.” 
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being Big anyway, such that within a few seconds we should be almost certain that the world is Big. 
Moreover, once we become convinced that the world is probably Big, we are unable to do many 
routine scientific things like measure the CMB, and each time we learn about such measurements, 
we massively raise our credence that we are freak observers! (See appendix for further discussion.) 
 So far I’ve just talked about Compartmentalized Conditionalization, which is a specific view 
within the Hold-Steady category. Does the argument apply to every view of this type? 
 I think it does. The argument was originally designed to shoot down Full Non-Indexical 
Conditionalization (though not by that name, since the term hadn’t been coined yet). FNC, 
promoted by Neal (2006) is the view that you should conditionalize on all your non-indexical 
evidence. (I suspect that it is equivalent to Compartmentalized Conditionalization.) So the only two 
views in this camp that I know of fall prey to this argument.32 
Moreover, it seems like the reason why World 2 is intuitively disconfirmed by the red 
evidential state has something to do with the fact that the number of red evidential states in World 2 
is so much smaller than the number of orange evidential states, and moreover the reason why World 
1 comes out ahead is that, compared to World 2, World 1 lost very few evidential states in the 
transition from orange to red. Of course, these facts may not be the proximate justifications, but 
surely they are involved somehow. So a view of this type—a view which says that such facts are 
irrelevant—seems problematic. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32Nilanjan Das at one point proposed a “Relevance-Limiting Thesis” which is yet another example of a view in the 
neither-kind category that falls to this argument. The thesis states that changes in your evidential state that don’t rule 
out two possible worlds don’t change your relative credence in them. (Das, personal conversation) 
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VI. Defending the Up-And-Down View 
 
 Let’s step back a bit and assess the situation. I’ve discussed three prominent kinds of views 
about how to reason in response to evidence. I’ve explained one major problem for each of them, 
and I’ve argued that the problem for the Hold-Steady views is far worse than Meacham thought. In 
the remainder of this paper, I’ll argue that the problem for the Up-And-Down view is not as bad as 
Meacham makes it sound. 
 To do this, I’ll take up a particular view and show that it fits into the Up-And-Down 
category. I’ll then reexamine the Many-Brains Argument and split it into two versions, one involving 
potential infinities and another involving actual infinities. I will present a more or less “straight” 
solution to the first version in Section 7, and then in Section 8 I’ll say some things to dampen the 
force of the second version. 
 The view I’ll be defending is called SSA, for Self-Sampling Assumption.33 It’s what you get 
when you combine Synchronic Centered Conditionalization with an indifference constraint on the 
hypothetical prior: 
Synchronic Centered Conditionalization: For any given agent, at any given time, the 
rational credence to have in any proposition A is P(A|E), where E is the total evidence 
available to the agent at that time, and P(.) is the agent’s hypothetical prior credence 
function. 
 
Indifference Constraint: Centered worlds that are part of the same possible world should 
get the same prior. 
 
                                                 
33
 I call it that because that’s what Bostrom calls it. I caution that my version isn’t exactly the same as Bostrom’s 
view, but it almost is. The major difference is that Bostrom says we should reason as if randomly selected from our 
reference class rather than from all centers in the world. He leaves it wide open what we should take our reference 
class to be. I don’t think this difference means much in this context, because I’ve left it wide open what we should 
take centers to be. A similar view is defended by Arntzenius and Dorr (2016). 
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SSA entails the Up-And-Down thesis.34 It also an instance of the class of views that 
Meacham explicitly targets in his version of the Many-Brains Argument.35 And it’s quite a popular 
view: As best as I can tell, all of the versions of the Up-And-Down view that I mention in the chart 
in Section 2 are equivalent to or closely related to SSA. So if SSA can survive the Many-Brains 
Argument, then the Up-And-Down thesis has been successfully defended. 
Recall the Many-Brains Argument: Since increases in the relative number of centers 
compatible with your evidence cause you to increase your relative credence, your relative credence in 
a skeptical hypothesis in which many duplicates of you are constantly being created will increase 
over time, eventually reaching unacceptably high levels. The argument is supposed to start with a toy 
case in which you only consider two possible worlds, and then generalize to our actual situation with 
many possibilities. This generalization is the step I wish to challenge. 
In the next section I will show that, if your priors behave nicely, when we generalize to 
include all finite possibilities, the increases in credence that some skeptical hypotheses get will be 
exactly cancelled out by decreases in credence that other skeptical hypotheses will get, so that your 
overall credence in skepticism (and, correspondingly, in the normal, non-skeptical hypotheses) will 
stay the same. In Section 8, I’ll explore what happens when we generalize further and include 
infinitely large possibilities. The situation here is much more murky. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 To see this, consider the original case (from Figure 1) and think about how SSA handles it. 
 
35
 Meacham aims his argument at any view which follows SCC, Elga’s Indifference Principle (which says that 
centers in the same evidential state & world get the same prior) and a Continuity Principle (which says that the ratio 
of prior in centers in the normal world to certain nonenvatted centers in the skeptical worlds should remain constant 
over time). (Meacham 24) The indifference constraint of SSA entails both of these two latter principles. 
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VII. Cancelling 
 
In this section I’ll talk about what happens when we generalize the Many-Brains argument to 
include every finite possibility—specifically, every possibility in which the number of centers is 
finite. 
The Many-Brains Argument initially considers just one pair of hypotheses: A normal world 
and a skeptical world just like it but with increasing numbers of duplicates. When we generalize to 
include all the worlds, we’ll add many more such pairs. But that won’t be all that we add. In addition 
to including more normal worlds, and more skeptical worlds just like them but with increasing 
numbers of brains, we’ll also include more skeptical worlds just like them but with decreasing numbers 
of brains, and also with oscillating numbers of brains, and so on. In fact, for every normal world, and 
for every function assigning numbers to evidential states in that world, there is a skeptical world just 
like that normal world except with numbers of duplicate brains determined by that function. 
On an up-and-down view, your credence in skeptical hypotheses in which the number of 
duplicates is increasing (relative to your credence in the normal hypothesis from which it is derived) 
will be constantly going up. However, at the same time and for the same reason, your credence in 
skeptical hypotheses in which the number of duplicates is decreasing will constantly be going down. 
This might seem strange, but it really isn’t: It’s actually a standard feature of Bayesian views. (Recall 
the earlier example of the skeptical hypothesis in which there is an A-loving demon hell-bent on 
making you observe A. When you observe A, your credence in that hypothesis will go up, and your 
credence in the similar B-loving-demon hypothesis will go down. On any Bayesian view, skeptical 
hypotheses will be getting confirmed and disconfirmed all the time.) The important question is, will 
your credence in skeptical hypotheses simpliciter go up or not?  
25 
 
It can be proven that, for SSA at least, given a natural assumption about your priors, the 
answer is no: 
Cancelling: The skeptical worlds can be divided into equivalence classes, such that if your 
prior is distributed evenly across the sub-classes within each class, your credence in the 
skeptical worlds as a whole will not change at all over time (if you follow SSA). Moreover, if 
your prior is not distributed evenly, the difference in your posterior credence will be at most 
the difference in your prior. (Proof in appendix) 
 
It’s fair game to invoke a feature of our priors to defend against the reductio, because trivially 
every Bayesian view will yield absurd results for some priors. The important question is whether or 
not priors that we ought to have lead to absurd results.  
 So, thanks to Cancelling, if only our priors are (or should be) more or less evenly distributed 
within these equivalence classes of skeptical hypotheses, the Many Brains Argument just doesn’t 
work (in the finite cases at least.) But are our priors like that? Should they be like that? Perhaps we 
should reject this antecedent. 
 I don’t have a positive argument in favor of the antecedent—I don’t need one, since I’m on 
the defensive here. In the remainder of this section, I will defend it against an anticipated objection. 
But before I do, I wish to emphasize that it isn’t enough to show that the antecedent is false; to 
make trouble for SSA we need to show that the antecedent is systematically false in a way that leads to 
absurd results for SSA. Continuing the analogy from before, suppose we successfully argue that a 
blue-loving demon really is more likely than a purple-loving demon because blue takes up more 
space in the range of light-wave frequencies or something. Have we thereby made a reductio of 
Bayesianism? No, because even though our credence in skeptical hypotheses as a whole might rise 
when we see blue, it won’t rise by much, and if we see purple, it will shrink by a corresponding 
amount. The second part of Cancelling proves that similar reasoning will apply in the many-brains 
case. 
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 One way to reject the antecedent would be to say that within the chain of centers that makes 
up a person over time, certain times are more likely to be duplicated (in greater numbers) than others. 
For example, you might think that later times are more likely to have more duplicates, perhaps 
because of some intuition about the direction of time and the way causal processes work. Suppose 
we find this much convincing: It’s systematically easier to create more brains as time goes on than to 
create a bunch of brains at the beginning and slowly delete them.  
This actually isn’t enough to get the conclusion above, because centers at different times can 
have the same evidential state.36 The issue is that there are two kinds of brain-duplication hypotheses 
that start small and grow larger: The first kind is the kind discussed so far, where at each time t, the 
duplicates are all in the same evidential state—so, when new brains are created, they are created in 
the same state as all the others. The second kind of brain-duplication hypothesis is one that creates 
new brains in the original evidential state, as depicted below: 
                                                 
36
Earlier in the paper we dealt with simplified cases in which this was not true, but now we are relaxing that 
simplification. 
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These two kinds of worlds will cancel out, provided their priors are similar. I see no reason to think 
they aren’t. 
To conclude this section: While individual brain-duplication hypotheses may end up favored 
by your evidence, the group as a whole is not, unless your priors in the hypotheses in the group are 
systematically biased in certain ways. I’ve explored one way they could be systematically biased, and 
defused it. The overall conclusion is that, for finite hypotheses at least, the Many-Brains Argument 
just doesn’t work. 
 
VIII. Actual Infinities 
 
 In this section I’ll talk about what happens when we extend the space of possibilities to 
include infinitely large worlds. (Specifically, worlds with infinitely many centers in them.) 
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 Unfortunately, I can’t invoke Cancelling here because my proof made use of the fact that the 
possibilities were finite. That doesn’t mean it’s false here—maybe the infinite possibilities will cancel 
out too—just that it hasn’t been proven one way or another. 
 Part of the problem is that it is unclear what the right way to assign prior to centers in 
infinite worlds is. It’s incoherent to divide it up evenly, as SSA and many other views say you  
should.37 How to handle infinitely large worlds is a wide-open question and there’s no reason to 
think that the eventual answer will vindicate the Many-Brains Argument.38 
 Besides, there is some reason to think that the eventual answer won’t vindicate the Many-
Brains Argument: There are probably multiple more or less reasonable ways to handle infinite 
cases.39 As long as there is at least one reasonable way to handle infinite cases that doesn’t vindicate the 
Many-Brains Argument, Up-And-Down views are safe, because they can choose to use that way. 
All of this is, admittedly, quite speculative. So here’s another, independent consideration: 
Notice that even within the infinite possibilities, our lifespans are finite in most of them. And, 
plausibly, whatever measure we choose over infinitely many centers, if there are only finitely many 
centers in our lifespan, the relevant sets of skeptical hypotheses involving different growth functions  
for those centers will cancel out.40 So the only possibilities we need to worry about are those in 
                                                 
37Elga’s Indifference Principle, alternatively known as the Weak Indifference Principle, is widely accepted and yet 
doesn’t work in infinite cases. It says that your credence in two centered worlds which are in the same possible 
world and which are in the same evidential state should be equal. Even weaker indifference principles will still get 
the same result; consider an indifference principle which only applies to centers which are in exactly the same 
environments, with exactly the same causal histories, etc.--even this restricted principle will break down when 
applied to possible worlds that contain infinitely many parallel universes, all exactly the same, each one of which 
contains a center. 
 
38
By contrast, the Sadistic Scientists and Varied Brains arguments work more or less the same when we restrict 
ourselves to arbitrarily large finite hypotheses. 
 
39
That is, multiple ways to handle infinite cases that are about as reasonable as the alternatives. I expect that none of 
the ways will seem extremely compelling—that’s precisely my point, in fact. 
 
40
It cancels out when there aren’t infinitely many alien centers, so why would adding a bunch of other centers 
elsewhere in spacetime that are clearly distinguishable from me make a difference? 
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which we literally live forever, experiencing infinitely many different evidential states. Most of us 
assign very low credence to the proposition that we will live forever in this way. So the effect this 
will have on our actual beliefs will be extremely small—by stark contrast with Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization. 
So I think that even if the Many-Brains Argument works in the infinite case—and it’s not at 
all clear that it does—it won’t make a noticeable difference in our credences until we are convinced 
(on the basis of ordinary evidence) that we have a significant chance of living forever, and even then, 
it will take a while. By contrast, the Varied Brains Argument applies to us already, given 
contemporary cosmological theories. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
 There are more problems (challenges?) facing these views than the three reductios I’ve 
considered. And while I have defended the Up-And-Down thesis from the Many-Brains argument, 
my defense is not airtight; perhaps one day someone will successfully argue that we ought to have 
uneven priors in skeptical hypotheses, such that they wouldn’t cancel out. Similarly, perhaps a more 
thorough exploration of the ways to handle infinities will bring back the Many-Brains argument as 
strong as ever. Nevertheless, I think I have shown that the Up-And-Down thesis is more promising 
than the Hold-Steady or the Down-Only theses.  
 The only alternative, as far as I can tell, is an It-Depends view: Perhaps we can do better than 
Up-And-Down views if we say that increases and decreases in credence are justified in some cases 
but not others, in a way that depends on more than just the relative numbers of centers-compatible-
with-your-evidence. As I said before, the challenge for views of this sort is to specify the features-
on-which-it-depends in such a way that none of the three arguments apply, without being 
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completely ad hoc. This is difficult, because the arguments can be modified to add further features 
as needed. For example, you might say credence does sometimes go down when the relative number 
of centers compatible with your evidence goes down, but only in situations where experiencing 
something else was possible. This would avoid all of the reductios as they are currently stated, but the 
Sadistic Scientists argument could be trivially modified to apply.41 I personally look forward to 
exploring this region of conceptual space; perhaps there really is a principled It Depends view which 
avoids all three arguments, and which avoids the Many-Brains argument in a more conclusive, 
airtight way than SSA does. We shall have to look and see. In the meantime, SSA (and the Up-And-
Down thesis more generally) is the least bad option on the table.42 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
To make the modification, just add that the duplicates created by the scientists are allowed to live a few seconds 
longer, but given different experiences than the original during those additional seconds. Now, at the time of a 
duplication, there are two possibilities for who you could be: the original and the duplicate, and because their 
experiences diverge in the future, there are two possibilities for what you are about to experience. 
 
42
Many thanks to John Roberts, Matt Kotzen, and Carla Merino-Rajme for helpful discussion and feedback on 
earlier drafts. Thanks also to Andrew Prudhon for conversation about the Cancelling proof. 
31 
 
X. Appendix 
 
10.1 Proof that, for SSA, the expected value of the posterior in a duplicate world 𝐷𝑖 equals the prior 
in 𝐷𝑖 for any finite i, and likewise for the non-skeptical world𝑊𝑖. (Yes, this means it holds for any 
finite world. I don’t know how to compute things for infinite worlds.) 
 The expected value of something is the weighted average of all the possible values of that 
thing, where the weight of each value is the prior probability of it obtaining. So the expected value 
of the posterior in Di is as follows: 
𝐸𝑉(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟(𝐷𝑖)) = ∑
𝑖
𝑡
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝐷𝑖) ∗ 𝑓𝑖(𝑡)
𝑃(𝐷𝑖) ∗ 𝑓𝑖(𝑡)  +  𝑃(𝑊𝑖)/𝑖
 
(Here we use 𝑓𝑖(t) instead of t/(pop of 𝐷𝑖), since we are considering the generalized case.) 
Meanwhile, the weight assigned to a given time/evidential state t is just the prior probability that that 
state would obtain, which is as follows: 
weight(t) =𝑃(𝐷𝑖) ∗ 𝑓𝑖(𝑡)  +  𝑃(𝑊𝑖)/𝑖 
Putting it together, a lot cancels out, and we get: 
𝐸𝑉(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟(𝐷𝑖)) = ∑
𝑖
𝑡
𝑃(𝐷𝑖) ∗ 𝑓𝑖(𝑡) 
Now, by the definition of 𝑓𝑖(t), we know that: 
∑
𝑖
𝑡
𝑓𝑖(𝑡) = 1 
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So the expected value of the posterior in 𝐷𝑖 equals the prior in 𝐷𝑖 .
43 Note that this is not the case for 
Compartmentalized Conditionalization; for a compartmentalized conditionalizer, the posterior in the 
proposition “The world is Big” will be higher than the prior for every evidential state, and thus the 
expected value will be too. 
 
10.2 Cancelling, part I: Proof that the skeptical worlds can be divided into equivalence classes, 
such that if your prior is distributed evenly across the sub-classes within each class, your credence in 
the skeptical worlds as a whole will not change at all over time (if you follow SSA).  
 
Let 𝑊𝑖 be an arbitrary non-skeptical possible world. Define the 𝑓𝑖𝑗(. )’s as the class of functions that 
distribute measure (summing to 1) across all the evidential states in 𝑊𝑖. Define 𝐷𝑖𝑗as the class of all 
of the worlds which are like 𝑊𝑖 but with additional duplicate centers, such that the prior that each 
world d in 𝐷𝑖𝑗assigns to any given evidential state E is  𝑃(𝑑) ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝐸). (Unless we have reason to 
think duplicates of us are likely in the actual world, the class of all𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s will consist entirely of 
skeptical hypotheses and hence have an extremely small total prior probability.)  
 
Definition: Two 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s, 𝐷𝑖𝑎and 𝐷𝑖𝑏, are permutation-equivalent iff there is some mapping M(.) from the 
evidential states in 𝑊𝑖to the evidential states in 𝑊𝑖 that is one-one and onto, such that  
𝑓𝑖𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖𝑏(𝑀(𝑡)) 
                                                 
43
The same proof can be easily modified to show this holds for Wi too. 
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Permutation-equivalence partitions the 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s into equivalence classes.
44 Each equivalence class 
contains all and only the 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s whose 𝑓𝑖𝑗 ’s have the same structure. A diagram helps illustrate the 
idea:  
 
Now suppose that any two permutation-equivalent 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s get the same prior probability. Then every 
equivalence class has a uniform prior, i.e. the prior of the equivalence class as a whole is evenly 
distributed among all the members of the class. (This is coherent because there are only finitely 
many members; there are only finitely many members because i is finite.) 
 It follows that each equivalence class, taken as a whole, will assign the same prior probability 
to each evidential state. (In other words, P(t1&C) = P(t2&C) for all t1, t2, where C is an arbitrary 
equivalence class of 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s.) 
                                                 
44
That is, the permutation-equivalence relation is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. 
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 Here is why: 
 The prior probability that an evidential state t gets from an equivalence class C is the sum, 
over all 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s in C, of P(𝐷𝑖𝑗)*𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑡).  The 𝑓𝑖𝑗(. )’s in C consist of all the possible ways to reshuffle a 
particular series of bars, so to speak, over a list of colors. (Recall the diagram.) So the situation is 
perfectly symmetric for each color; the total length of all the bars they get will be the same. So each 
evidential state gets the same total prior, once you add up all the 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’s in C.  
 So, having established that each equivalence class assigns the same prior probability to each 
evidential state, we can conclude that 𝐷𝑖 , the class of skeptical hypotheses as a whole, assigns the 
same prior probability to each evidential state:   𝑃(𝐷𝑖)/𝑖. (It is, after all, the aggregate of many such 
equivalence classes.) Now, 𝑊𝑖 assigns the same prior probability to each evidential state too, 
𝑃(𝑊𝑖)/𝑖, because there is only one center for each evidential state and SSA divides the prior evenly 
among all centers. So the relative posterior credence in 𝑊𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖will be the same as the priors, for 
every evidential state. 
 
10.3 Cancelling, part II: Proof that, if your prior is not distributed evenly, the difference in your 
posterior credence will be at most the difference in your prior.  
 
Consider the worst-case equivalence class C, i.e. the one in which each fij() assigns 100% of 
its total probability mass to a single evidential state.45 There are i evidential states, and thus we can 
divide this class into i sub-classes, each one choosing a different evidential state to concentrate on. 
 
                                                 
45
Or arbitrarily close to 100%, if we want to stick with the earlier simplifying assumption that every evidential state 
in Wi also occurs in Di. 
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In this scenario, the prior that C assigns to a given evidential state E is simply the prior of 
the relevant sub-class of C that concentrates on E. So the likelihood of E given C is simply the prior 
of that sub-class of C that concentrates on E (divided by the prior of C). 
So P(C|E) = P(E|C)*P(C)/P(E) = (prior of the sub-class of C that concentrates on 
E)/P(E) 
 Now, where W is any normal hypothesis, i.e. one without duplication, 
P(W|E) = (1/i)*P(W)/P(E), by SSA. So the ratio of the posterior in C to the posterior in W is: 
i*(prior of the sub-class of C that concentrates on E)/P(W) 
Now, when the priors in C are evenly spread across each sub-class, the numerator will equal 
P(C), because the prior of each sub-class of C will be P(C)/i. 
What happens when they are not? Well, suppose we multiply the prior in the sub-class that 
concentrates on E by a factor of M (and subtract prior from other sub-classes in C so that it 
balances out—notice that this means M can be at most i.)  
Then the ratio of the posterior in C to the posterior in S (at E) will be multiplied by a factor 
of M too. 
So in general, for this “worst-case” scenario, imbalances in the priors which prevent 
cancelling will cause exactly proportional imbalances in the posteriors. Notice that even in this 
worst-case scenario, the imbalance in the posteriors only happens at one particular evidential state; 
when you average over all evidential states there is no imbalance. 
Now, I’ve been calling this the worst-case scenario without justification so far. But consider: 
No equivalence class is more extreme than this one when it comes to imbalances in the priors 
leading to imbalances in the posteriors; any other equivalence class will contain 𝑓𝑖𝑗(. )′𝑠 that assign 
probability to more than one evidential state, for example, and so the posterior credence in any 
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given evidential state will be more than just the credence assigned to it by one sub-class, and so 
multiplying the prior of one sub-class by M will affect the posterior by less than M. 
 
10.4 Discussion of Meacham’s Defense of Compartmentalized Conditionalization: 
 
Recall that, as I interpret him, Meacham’s defense against the Varied Brains argument is 
somewhat similar to my Cancelling-invoking defense against the Many Brains argument. He seems 
to be hoping that when we add in the additional skeptical worlds, there will be skeptical worlds ruled 
out by our ordinary experiences, and they’ll be ruled out in sufficient numbers to balance out the 
fact that the Big Worlds are not ruled out. In this appendix section I will summarize the reasons to 
think that this strategy doesn’t work very well for Compartmentalized Conditionalization. I’ll go into 
somewhat more detail than I did in the main text. 
First, Cancelling doesn’t apply, because the proof involves a certain notion of permutation-
equivalence that just doesn’t work in the case of Compartmentalized Conditionalization. The 
alternative worlds Meacham will need to invoke are going to be worlds that have no centers in 
various evidential states, not worlds that permute the numbers of centers in a given list of evidential 
states. So at best an analogue of Cancelling might apply. 
Second, as I showed in 10.1, for SSA the expected value of the posterior in any hypothesis 
or set of hypotheses equals the prior, but for Compartmentalized Conditionalization, the posterior 
in any Big World hypothesis is greater than the prior, and so the expected value is too. That’s weird. 
Third, even if something like Cancelling works for Meacham (or doesn’t work for me) such 
that the two views are on a par in this respect, there’s still the other problem for Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization, namely the problem about being unable to change your relative credences in the 
different Big Worlds. 
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Fourth, and most importantly, for the Cancelling strategy to work, there must be a big stock 
of skeptical hypotheses which get billions of times more credence than the Big Worlds, which can 
be sacrificed to balance out the gain that the Big Worlds get. So for the Cancelling strategy to work, 
you have to be able to look cosmologists in the eye and tell them that not only are their beliefs 
wrong, they are so wrong that a certain class of skeptical hypotheses is way more plausible! 
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